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Modeling Reputational and Informational Influences 
 in Threshold Models of Bandwagon Innovation Diffusion 
 
Abstract 
 
Bandwagon innovation diffusion is characterized by a positive feedback loop 
where adoptions by some actors increase the pressure to adopt for other actors.  In 
particular, when gains from an innovation are difficult to quantify, such as implementing 
quality circles or downsizing practices, diffusion is likely to occur through a bandwagon 
process.  In this paper we extend Abrahamson and Rosenkopf’s (1993) model of 
bandwagon diffusion to examine both reputational and informational influences on this 
process.  We find that the distribution of reputations among the set of potential adopters 
affects the extent of bandwagon diffusion under conditions of moderate ambiguity, and 
we find that bandwagons occur even when potential adopters receive information about 
others’ unprofitable experiences with the innovation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Reviews of the innovation diffusion literature have repeatedly denounced its pro-
innovation bias -- the assumption that the diffusion of innovations benefits organizations 
(Rogers, 1983; 1995; Zaltman, Duncan and Holbeck, 1973; Kimberly, 1981; Van de Ven, 
1986; Abrahamson, 1991). Much of this literature implicitly assumes that profitable 
innovations diffuse and that innovations that diffuse must be profitable1. 
Pro-innovation biases have two consequences. First, because these biases suggest 
that innovations benefit adopters, researchers often assume that innovations diffuse fully 
across potential adopters, and few researchers examine how extensively innovations 
diffuse (Rogers, 1983: 97). Most researchers focus, instead, on explaining diffusion rates. 
Second, because pro- innovation biases suggest that only profitable innovations diffuse, 
few researchers examine the diffusion of unprofitable innovations (Kimberly, 1981). As 
a result, we still know little about when unprofitable innovations diffuse in a fad- like 
fashion at the expense of adopting organizations.  
Examples of the diffusion of unprofitable innovations abound.  Quality circles 
diffused widely through U.S. firms in the 1980s, accompanied by a wave of popular 
press, yet their value was equivocal at best (Abrahamson and Fairchild, forthcoming).   
The practice of downsizing, originally heralded by consultants and markets alike, has 
more recently been associated with negative impact on productivity, morale and trust 
over the longer term (Cameron, 1998). 
                                                                 
    1 Certain innovation-diffusion theories explain why, when multiple variants of an innovation contend for dominance, one 
variant prevails, even if it is less technically efficient. These theories and models exp lain, for example, why Matsushita's 
less-efficient VHS standard in VCRs won out over Sony's more-efficient Betamax standard (Arthur, 1983). Others explain 
why more-efficient variants of innovations fail to replace less-efficient variants. They explain, for instance, why the more 
efficient Dvorak standard in typewriter key boards did not replace the less efficient QWERTY standard (David, 1985). 
These theories do not explain, however, why innovations that remain unprofitable diffuse. More generally, this paper is 
concerned only with theories explaining the diffusion of one type of innovation, not of its variants. 
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 Our aim in this paper is to extend our thresho ld model of bandwagon diffusion 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993) in two ways.  First, we consider how the distribution 
of reputations among organizations in a collectivity affects whether and when an 
unprofitable innovation is likely to diffuse in a bandwagon fashion.  Second, we explore 
whether these effects are robust even under conditions where we permit knowledge about 
the unprofitability of the innovation to become discernable and public after each 
adoption. 
 The combination of these two aims results in a model that combines features of 
what Abrahamson (1991) called “efficient-choice” and “fad” theories of bandwagon  
diffusion.  In their extreme form, efficient-choice theories assume that organizations 
make rational adoption decisions based only on information about an innovation’s 
technical efficiency and profitability.  In contrast, extreme-form fad theories assume that 
information about efficiency and profitability is either not communicated to potential 
adopters, or is so ambiguous that it does not influence adoption decisions.  Under these 
conditions, organizations do not premise their adoption decisions on technical or 
profitability information, but rather on information about the number and reputation of 
previous adopters (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Our model, by 
incorporating aspects of efficient-choice and fad theories, follows in the tradition of theorists 
who acknowledge both economic and social influences on the decision to adopt (Burt, 1973; 
1980; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Banerjee, 1992).  
2.  Theoretical Review 
2.1  Threshold Models of Bandwagons  
 In bandwagon models, a collectivity is defined as a set of members where when one 
member of the collectivity adopts an innovation, other members obtain information about 
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this adoption (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Bandwagons have a positive feedback 
loop in which information generated by more adoptions creates a stronger bandwagon 
pressure, and a stronger bandwagon pressure prompts more adoptions. Not all members of a 
collectivity necessarily give in to a bandwagon pressure. Threshold models assume that 
members of a collectivity have varying predispositions against adopting an innovation. A 
member will give in to a bandwagon pressure to adopt only if it exceeds this member's 
threshold -- the point at which the strength of the bandwagon pressure to adopt is greater 
than the member's predisposition against adopting (David, 1969). Therefore, a member with 
a high threshold adopts only in response to a strong bandwagon pressure, whereas it only 
takes a weak bandwagon pressure to cause a member with a low threshold to adopt, and it 
takes no bandwagon pressure for a member with a zero threshold to adopt. 
 We employ a threshold model in this paper because such models can easily describe 
complex processes that cause bandwagons to start and various proportions of a collectivity's 
members to adopt. Members with zero thresholds have no predisposition against adopting 
and they adopt first. Their adoptions cause the strength of the bandwagon pressure to 
increase. Members whose threshold is exceeded by this increase in the bandwagon pressure 
adopt, further raising the strength of the bandwagon pressure, and possibly prompting still 
more adoptions. There can be repeated cycles of this process in which more adoptions raise 
the strength of the bandwagon pressure and the strength of the bandwagon pressure causes 
more adoptions. This cycle stops whenever the increase in the bandwagon pressure, in one 
cycle of the process, is not sufficient to prompt the non-adopter with the lowest threshold to 
adopt. A bandwagon's extent equals the proportion of adopters when the bandwagon cycle 
stops. 
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 Note that threshold models can explain why a bandwagon would stop before all 
members of a collectivity had adopted. Indeed, if at any stage of a bandwagon, all non-
adopters have a threshold that exceeds the bandwagon pressure, the bandwagon stops. 
Threshold models indicate that the distribution of thresholds in collectivities of individuals 
generally has a major impact on the extent of bandwagon diffusion in these collectivities 
(Granovetter, 1978; Schelling, 1978; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993).  In addition, the 
network of relations among collectivity members also has a major impact on bandwagon 
extent (Valente, 1995; 1996; Krackhardt, 1997; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). 
2.2  Efficient-choice Theories of Bandwagons  
Efficient-choice theories assume that organizations adopt innovations based on 
information about their technical efficiency or profitability. Assumptions about the 
availability of this information vary.  One type of efficient-choice theory assumes complete 
information -- all organizations find out unambiguous information about innovations' 
profitability instantaneously. Some of these complete-information theories assume negative 
externalities, where returns to any adopter decline with the number of adopters, yet more 
adoptions occur because costs decline the latter the adoption date (Reinganum, 1981; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983; Quirmbach, 1986). Other complete- information theories 
assume that profits increase with the number of adopters. This occurs because of positive 
externalities, such as the network case where the more organizations adopt a communication 
standard, the greater the returns to each adopter because it can communicate with more 
adopters (Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  
 Complete-information theories have been modeled using threshold models. These 
models rest on the assumption that organizations vary along certain characteristics, usually 
size, that determine their adoption thresholds -- the magnitude of an innovation's 
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profitability that will prompt an organization to adopt it (David, 1969; Davies, 1979). As 
organizational size, for example, varies from low to high, so too will adoption thresholds.  
As an innovation's costs or returns change because of forces either endogenous or 
exogenous to the diffusion process, more organizations are pushed over their adoption 
thresholds and they adopt.   
 A second type of efficient-choice theory assumes incomplete information 
(Mansfield, 1961), so that organizations are assumed to be uncertain about the profitability 
of innovations. As more organizations adopt an innovation, however, they generate more 
information about the innovations' true efficiency and profitability (Rogers, 1983: 244). 
Information about technically-efficient and profitable innovations tends to cause non-
adopters to revise their initial assessed profits upward past some threshold at which point 
they adopt. 
Incomplete-information theories have also been modeled using threshold models. 
These models also rest on the assumption that organizations, or their decision-makers, have 
different adoption thresholds -- how profitable information must reveal an innovation to be 
before they adopt it. When the same information about a profitable innovation reaches 
organizations, lower-threshold organizations adopt it before higher-threshold organizations. 
In these models organizations either learn-by-doing (Stoneman, 1981) or learn-by-others-
doing about the technical efficiency or profitability of innovations (Feder and O'Mara, 1982; 
Oren and Schwartz, 1988; Chatterjee and Eliashberg, 1989; Lattin and Roberts, 1989). 
These models generally assume that organizations, or their decision-makers, update their 
assessments of innovations' profitability in a Bayesian fashion.  
 Another approach to incomplete information is seen in the literature that 
incorporates social network effects.   In this case, even if profitability information is 
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perfectly accurate, it is not uniformly available to all members of the collectivity.  Here, 
actors will adopt if they communicate with a set of actors that provide information that 
validates the innovation.  This information may be transmitted through cohesion (Burt, 
1973) or through the monitoring that occurs via structural equivalence (Burt, 1980).  
Complexity in patterns of interaction has been modeled by Carley (1991; 1995) and Kaufer 
and Carley (1993), where we observe dramatic discrepancies in the knowledge of various 
actors due to their tendencies to exchange information with more homogeneous others.  
Valente (1995; 1996) and Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) have modeled adoption 
thresholds as a function of the subset of actors that communicate with a potential adopter, 
rather than the entire collectivity of potential adopters. 
 In either case (complete or incomplete information), it should be obvious that 
profitability information will only lead a non-adopter to adopt when there is indeed profit to 
be gained by adopting the innovation.  Ultimately, such models may reinforce at least one 
component of the pro-innovation bias, as no adopter will be swayed to adopt an unprofitable 
innovation. 
2.3 Fad Theories of Bandwagons   
In the extreme, fad theories do not admit any information about profitability.  In reality, 
there is a continuum of approaches that relax the assumptions of efficient-choice models.  
The major theme of all of these models is the idea of ambiguity.  Greater environmental 
turbulence and complexity causes information about innovations to be ambiguous (Aldrich, 
1979; Milliken, 1987; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Carley (1995) suggests that ambiguity 
increases diffusion by increasing actors’ receptivity to new ideas.  
Ambiguity differs from uncertainty.  Milliken (1987) distinguished three types of 
ambiguity.  State ambiguity denotes the degree of ignorance, on the part of decision-makers, 
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about possible future environmental states.  Effect ambiguity denotes the degree of 
ignorance about the effect of environmental states, whether or not those states are clear.  
Response ambiguity denotes a lack of clarity about the outcomes of choices in response to 
environmental states, regardless of their clarity.  State, effect and response ambiguity make 
the range of choice alternatives unclear.  Moreover, state, effect and response ambiguity 
obscure both the range of possible outcomes from making a choice and the probability of 
these outcomes occurring.  Finally, state, effect and response ambiguity can obscure which 
type of outcome should be maximized.  Thus under conditions of uncertainty, the range of 
alternatives, the range of outcomes for each alternative, and the probability of each outcome 
are assumed to be clear.  Under conditions of ambiguity, one or all of these are unclear, and 
the model of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty cannot be assumed (March 
and Olsen, 1976).  
2.3.1 Two-stage diffusion processes 
 Rumelt (1974) tested Chandler's (1962) claim that organizations selected multi-
divisional structures (M-forms) because they efficiently solved diversification strategies' 
administrative problems. Diversification did correlate with M-form adoption from the 
1940's to the 1960's, but not after. This finding suggests an analytic distinction between 
an initial stage of diffusion, when organizations adopt innovations to solve organizational 
problems, and a later stage, when they adopt for some other reason. Researchers have 
found this two-stage pattern across a variety of contexts and innovations (Armour and 
Teece, 1978; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Meyer, Stevenson and Webster, 
1985; Baron, Dobbin and Jennings, 1986; Pennings and Harianto, 1992). 
Certain scholars argue that bandwagon processes cause two-stage patterns of 
bandwagon diffusion. Initial-stage adoptions of an innovation occur because certain 
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organizations assess an innovation's profitability, decide that this innovation is 
technically efficient and profitable, and adopt it. Kimberly's (1981: 88-90) review of the 
innovation-adoption literature indicates that an organization's assessment of an 
innovation's profitability depends on various characteristics of this organization's 
structure, network position, decision makers, and environment. 
In the initial stage, certain organizations may not adopt because they expect a loss 
from adopting. Social comparison theory suggests, however, that these non-adopters are 
still vulnerable to social pressures to adopt this innovation in the later stage, if this 
innovation' s technical efficiency and profitability is ambiguous (Festinger, 1954; 
Thompson, 1967: 89). Social comparison theory suggests that when confronted with 
empirically ambiguous questions (that is, questions that cannot easily be answered by 
pointing to concrete facts, such as the profitability of an innovation), organizational 
decision makers tend to base their decisions on social cues (such as the number and 
reputation of other adopters).   In social networks, structurally equivalent actors have 
shown greater susceptibility to influence of this type, perhaps because structural 
equivalence encourages comparison (Burt, 1980).  Moreover, social comparison theory 
suggests that the greater ambiguity, the greater the pressure to adopt caused by 
information about the number and reputation of organizations that have adopted 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These pressures may be great enough to cause 
organizations that did not adopt in the initial stage, because they expected a loss from 
doing so, to nonetheless adopt in the later stage. 
2.3.2 Increasing bandwagon pressures 
A variety of fad theories explain why increases in the number and reputation of 
adopters cause social bandwagon pressures to grow. One sociological variant specifies 
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institutional bandwagon pressures -- pressures on organizations arising from the threat of 
lost legitimacy. In these theories, the more organizations adopt an innovation, and the 
greater these organizations' reputations, the more it becomes taken-for-granted that it is 
normal, or even legitimate, for organizations to use this innovation (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). When this happens, organizations that do not use the 
innovation tend to appear abnormal and illegitimate to their stakeholders; these 
organizations tend to adopt the innovation because of the fear of lost legitimacy and 
stakeholder support (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). A 
similar approach from economics assumes that organizations tend to adopt an innovation the 
more other organizations have adopted it because they will be evaluated more favorably if 
they do what other organizations are doing (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990).  
A second variant of fad theories describes competitive bandwagon pressures -- 
pressures on organizations arising from the threat of lost competitive advantage. Bandwagon 
pressures occur because, as the proportion of adopters increases, non-adopters experience a 
growing risk that if the innovation is a success, their performance will fall well below the 
collectivity average; they adopt to avoid running this risk (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 
1990; 1993).  Still a third variant of fad theories assumes that organizations adopt an 
innovation the more organizations adopt it because the number of adopters is taken as 
evidence that these adopters must know something that the non-adopters do not know 
(Banerjee, 1992). 
2.4  Reputational Influences on Diffusion Processes 
 It remains to examine how varying reputations of adopters may influence 
processes of bandwagon diffusion.  The most common finding is what Abrahamson and 
Fombrun (1994) call “trickle-down” diffusion, where adoptions by high-reputation actors 
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trigger imitations by lower-reputation actors.  Here, reputation may be assessed via 
response data, central network position, or other proxy characteristics such as 
organizational size.  Trickle-down processes have been found among individuals (e.g. 
Burt, 1973; Rogers, 1995) as well as among organizations (e.g. Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman, 1989; Davis, 1991; Mizruchi, 1992). 
 In contrast, “trickle-up” processes occur when adoptions by low-reputation actors 
trigger imitations by higher-reputation actors.  Trickle-up processes tend to diffuse 
contra-normative innovations (Becker, 1970; Krackhardt, 1997) as lower-reputation 
adopters are willing to take the risk of appearing deviant by adopting a contra-normative 
innovation in the hope that reputation will improve if the innovations succeeds (Burt, 
1980; Kimberly 1981; Rogers, 1995).  Under certain conditions, higher-reputation actors 
imitate, and the contra-normative innovation diffuses.  In many cases of trickle-up 
diffusion among organizations, incumbents fail to adopt contra-normative innovations, 
and are supplanted by new entrants who adopt and exploit such innovations (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986; Bower and Christensen, 1995).  In other cases, peripheral actors 
may forge coalitions that generate enough power to challenge the established order 
(Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). 
 In each case, research recognizes that actors of different statuses will have 
different influences on the diffusion process.  Latane (1996), in his dynamic social impact 
theory, suggests that actors vary in their “strength” of influence on others.  Podolny and 
Phillips (1996) offer empirical illustration of the evolution of status in the investment 
banking industry through examination of tombstone advertisements, and suggest that the 
dynamics of status evolution may depend on the initial distribution of status among the 
population.   
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 If adopter reputations determine the extent of bandwagon pressures, then the 
distribution of reputations among actors in a collectivity may affect the dynamics of 
bandwagon diffusion.  Specifically, we can imagine collectivities with higher or lower 
variance in the distribution of reputations.  A collectivity with low reputational variance 
has most members with similar reputational levels, while a collectivity with high 
reputational variance will have some obvious outliers that may be stars or dogs.   
 Thinking about a few industries over time he lps clarify the concept of reputational 
variance.  Kodak and Xerox traditionally dominated the photographic and photocopier 
industries in the United States; each was perceived as the highest quality player and 
rewarded with high market share.  Their reputations outweighed all of their competitors.  
More recently, however, each of these firms has had to share the spotlight with numerous 
other firms that have polished their reputations for innovativeness, quality, and value, so 
reputational variance in the industry has decreased.  In contrast, consider the funeral 
services market.  Traditionally operated through small, private businesses, no player 
outshone the others.  Yet recent waves of consolidation have led to the rise of a few 
chains that generate reputations through quality control and advertising.  In this industry, 
reputational variance is increasing. 
3.  Refining the Bandwagon Model 
 In two papers, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993; 1997) have presented a 
threshold model of bandwagon diffusion and explored some of its implications.  We 
extend this model to examine how information about adopter reputations and adopter 
experiences affect bandwagon extent, thereby combining features of both fad and 
efficient-choice models. 
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 The Abrahamson and Rosenkopf model is premised on the notion that an 
organization’s assessment of the viability of an innovation rests not only on some initial, 
rational assessment, but is also inflated by other firm’s adoptions.  They have shown, in a 
variety of contexts, that unprofitable innovations can diffuse in a bandwagon fashion in 
ambiguous environments, and also that bandwagons are encouraged by certain structural 
properties of communication networks. 
 In the basic model, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf assume that an organization will 
adopt an innovation if its “bandwagon assessment” of the innovation’s value is positive.  
The bandwagon assessment relies on the organization’s individual assessment, the 
ambiguity experienced by the firm, and the number of organizations that have already 
adopted the innovation.  To formalize: 
Let Bi,k = organization i’s bandwagon assessment of the innovation’s profitability  
in bandwagon cycle k 
 
Let Ii = organization i’s individual assessment of the innovation’s profitability 
 Let A = level of ambiguity organizations experience2 
 Let nk-1 = number/proportion of adopters after bandwagon cycle k-1 
 Since threshold models operate by specifying how many non-focal actors must 
choose to adopt in order to persuade the focal adopter to do so, organizations whose 
initial assessments exceed zero will not require any other adoptions to make their own 
decisions to adopt, and hence their threshold is zero.  In contrast, organizations whose 
initial assessments are less than zero will have nonzero thresholds.  Specifically, these 
organizations will only adopt if the bandwagon pressure caused by adoptions exceeds |Ii|.  
So Abrahamson and Rosenkopf model later-stage adoption decisions by summing 
                                                                 
2 The initial formulation of the model allows the level of ambiguity to vary across organizations and therefore appears 
as Ai in the original text.  The 1993 paper fixes Ai = A for all organizations, and we do the same here.  Effects of 
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organization’s individual assessments and the bandwagon pressure to create a 
“bandwagon assessment”; organizations adopt when the bandwagon assessment is greater 
than zero.  Since bandwagon theories suggest that bandwagon pressure increases with the 
number of adopters, but that the level of ambiguity moderates this relation, the 
bandwagon pressure can be modeled as the product of ambiguity and the number of 
adopters.   
 As in Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993:496), this yields equation one: 
 
 
where organizations adopt whenever BI,k > 0. 
 We extend this model in two ways for this paper.  First, we incorporate 
reputational effects on bandwagon pressure.  Since the original model counts the number 
of adopters, it weights all adoptions equally.  As we wish to place more weight on 
adoptions by high-reputation organizations, we replace the number of adoptions with a 
reputation-weighted count.  Specifically: 
 Let ri = reputation of organization i 
 Let Di,k = 1 if organization i has adopted by bandwagon cycle k; 0 otherwise 
 This gives us equation two:3  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
relaxing that assumption are explored in the appendix to the 1993 paper as well as in the 1997 paper.    
3 To standardize units, consider each term of the equation (bandwagon assessment on the left-hand side, initial assessed 
profits, and the reputational bandwagon pressure) to be measured in dollars.   For the reputational bandwagon pressure 
term, r represents the dollar value increase in bandwagon assessment attributable to the adoption by a specific actor, 
and A is a constant.  Thus the reputational bandwagon pressure terms offsets negative profits. 
)*( 1, ??? kiki nAIB 0?A
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 Second, we also consider how information about the outcomes organizations 
experience may influence the decisions of potential adopters.  Hence we add another 
component to the model which captures the effect of the average profits achieved by all 
prior adopters.  We assume that this profitability information is transmitted after some lag.  
Ambiguity also moderates this effect; however, in this case, the higher the ambiguity, the 
less weight placed on profitability information.  Specifically: 
 Let pi = actual profits achieved by organization i 
 Let L = number of cycles required to transmit profitability information (lag) 
 This gives us equation three,  
 
3.1  Simulation Assumptions  
Three assumptions underlie our simulation.  First, initial assessed profits and 
achieved profits are independently drawn from the same normal distribution.  Kimberly's 
(1981) review of the innovation-adoption literature indicates that an organization's assessed 
and achieved profits depend on various characteristics of its structure, network position, 
decision-makers, and environment. Because organizations differ on these characteristics, we 
assumed that different organizations in a collectivity would tend to assess different profits 
from adopting the same innovation, and would achieve different profits as well. Moreover, 
since many weakly correlated forces affect organizations' assessed and achieved profits, we 
assumed that they would tend to be normally distributed across these organizations. Finally, 
since different forces determine assessed and achieved profits, we assumed that 
organizations' assessments of the profits they achieve would be correct only on average. 
? ?
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Therefore, the mean and variance of the distribution of initially assessed and achieved 
profits would tend to be the same (for a similar modeling approach, see Burgelman and 
Mittman, 1993). 
 Second, reputations are also normally distributed. To distinguish between trickle-up, 
-down and -around processes, we assumed strong relationships between reputations and 
initial assessed profits.  Specifically, for trickle-down scenarios, we induced a correlation of 
+1.0 between organizations' reputations and initial assessed profits. So that, the higher an 
organization's reputation, the higher its initial assessed profits, and the higher its propensity 
to adopt initially. In contrast, for the trickle-up scenario, we induced a correlation of -1.0 
between organizations' reputations and initial assessed profits. Here, the lower an 
organization's reputation, the higher its initial assessed profits, and the higher its propensity 
to adopt initially. In the trickle-around scenario, we did not induce any correlation between 
initial assessed profits and reputations 4.  
 Third, information about adoptions and outcomes is available to all organizations at 
the start of the next cycle 5.  A flow diagram of our model may be found in Figure 1. 
3.2  Parameter Values 
1) The number of organizations in the collectivity is set to 20.  Note that for any given 
distribution of reputations, if the number of organizations were set extremely high (or 
low), bandwagon pressure would be so high (or low) as to motivate full (or no) diffusion 
                                                                 
    4 It might appear that results could be obtained analytically, where the expected proportion of imitators each period is 
calculated via forward recursion, as in Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993). However, the dependency between reputation 
and initial assessed returns complicates the calculation of the expected value of ? (ri * Di), the total reputation of adopters.  
This complication occurs because while firm reputations are normally distributed, the reputation values of adopters are 
correlated with their assessed returns.  Since adopters require assessed returns above a certain threshold, it follows that the 
reputations of these adopters are also clustered towards one end of the reputation distribution.  Thus, the total reputation of 
adopters follows a conditional normal distribution, and the calculation of its expectation requires extremely sophisticated 
integration.  We opted to use simulation to generate the proportion of imitators and to observe the dynamics of this 
process.  The simulation code is very straightforward and is available from the authors for empirical test of the model.  
 
5 We have considered social network effects in our 1997 paper and do not restrict information flow here. 
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in nearly every case.  We chose the level of 20 in conjunction with our reputational 
parameters in order to insure a range of bandwagon outcomes. 
2) The mean of the distribut ion of initial assessed profits is set to –1.0. We picked a 
negative value for the mean of the profits distributions because we wanted to examine 
the bandwagon diffusion of unprofitable innovations. Indeed, the greater the mean of the 
distribution of initial assessed profits, the more organizations will tend to assess profits 
from adopting and adopt based solely on these initial assessed profits. Bandwagon 
pressures, therefore, will have a limited effect on what percentage of a collectivity 
adopts. The most interesting cases occur, however, when the mean is negative. Then, 
most organizations perceive losses from adopting an innovation, and it can diffuse 
widely only because of a bandwagon process dominated by reputational bandwagon 
pressure. Such bandwagons can occur if the variance of the distribution of initial 
assessed profits is large enough so that a few organizations will tend to assess initially 
that they will make a profit from adopting, triggering reputational pressure that causes 
many organizations to adopt an unprofitable innovation. 
3) The standard deviation of the distribution of initial assessed profits (hereafter 
“assessed profits variance”) ranges from 0.0 to 1.5 in increments of 0.075.  Hence 
there are 20 values of assessed profits variance. 
4) The mean of the distribution of reputations is set to 1.0.  With this approach, when 
reputation variance is zero, the bandwagon effects reduce to a pure count of the number  
or proportion of adopters, as in Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993). 
5) The standard deviation of the distribution of reputations (hereafter “reputation 
variance”) ranges from 0.0 to 0.3 in increments of 0.025.  Hence there are 12 values of 
reputation variance.  Note that this range of values for reputation variance insures that 
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nearly all reputation draws will be positive; in the rare cases when the value is negative, 
we round the value up to zero. 
6) Ambiguity ranges from zero to one in increments of 0.05.  Hence there are 20 values of 
ambiguity. 
7) The learning lag L ranges from 1 to 6 by increments of 1.  However, in some 
simulations we set L to infinity, reducing equation three to equation two. 
4.  Results and Discussion 
 To interpret our results, we vary some parameter values while holding others 
constant.  We run three different simulations to explore how different combinations of 
assessed profits variance, reputation variance, ambiguity, and learning lags each affect 
bandwagon diffusion extent. 
 In all three simulations, for every possible combination of parameter values, 500 
iterations were performed and the proportion of bandwagon imitators averaged over all 
iterations.  Each iteration was permitted to run until diffusion ceased; this could take no 
more than 20 cycles for the non-learning models and 26 cycles for the learning models. 
4.1  Simulation 1:  Varying Assessed Profits and Reputations  
 We begin by examining how assessed profits variance and reputation variance affect 
the percentage of bandwagon imitators in the collectivity.  We do so without allowing 
learning (that is, we set L to infinity).  We fix the level of ambiguity (A) at a moderate level 
of 0.2.  This level was chosen, as will be seen in the subsequent simulation, because it is a 
value at which a lot of variability in outcomes may be observed.  Since we utilize twenty 
values of assessed profits variance and twelve values of reputation variance, a total of 240 
cases were simulated.   
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 Figure 2 graphs the results for the trickle-up, -down, and –around scenarios.  To aid 
the reader in viewing our outcomes graphically, we only present a subset of these cases 
which summarize the overall outcomes.  Specifically, in Figure 2 we limit our presentation 
to three levels of reputation variance (RV):  RV=0.0, RV=0.15, and RV=0.3.  We do so 
because the interim values yield a plethora of lines that are difficult to distinguish. 
 Several patterns are observable from Figure 2.  First, observe that ceteris paribus, the 
proportion of bandwagon adopters is greatest in the trickle-down scenario, followed by the 
trickle-around, and then the trickle-up scenario6.  Further, increasing reputation variance 
increases diffusion extent in the trickle-down case, decreases diffusion in the trickle-up case, 
and has no clear effect on diffusion extent in the trickle-around case.  These patterns occur 
because the greater the reputation of initial adopters, the greater the impetus they give to a 
bandwagon, and the more it diffuses the innovation. 
 More importantly, the results in Figure 2 suggest that a characteristic pattern 
reported in prior research (Granovetter, 1978; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; 1997) 
obtains regardless of whether we examine trickle-down, -up, or –around scenarios.  
Specifically, we observe two inflection points in these curves.  Bandwagons do not occur at 
assessed profits variances below approximately 0.4, but minor increases above this critical 
value result in many bandwagon adoptions.  In contrast, at assessed profits variances above 
approximately 1.0, we observe that increases beyond this value results in fewer bandwagon 
adoptions. 
 Simulation 1 suggests two propositions that hold under moderate levels of 
ambiguity,   
                                                                 
6 Closer inspection reveals that when RV=0.0, essentially the same results obtain for all three scenarios.  This is because 
when all reputations are equal, the bandwagon pressures are equivalent in each scenario. 
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   P1: When the variance of initial assessed profits across organizations in a 
collectivity is small, minor increases in this variance can result in major 
increases in the percentage of organizations that adopt an innovation during a 
trickle-up, trickle-down or trickle-around bandwagon. 
 
P2: When the variance of initial assessed profits across organizations in a 
collectivity is large, minor increases in this variance can result in decreases in 
the percentage of organizations that adopt an innovation during a trickle-up, 
trickle-down or trickle-around bandwagon. 
 
 What explains the first pattern (P1)? If the variance is small, then organizations 
assess roughly equal profits from adopting, and the distribution of initial assessed profits 
will tend to cluster around the mean, which is assumed to be negative. Because the mean of 
initial assessed profits is negative, there is only a small probability that organizations will 
not assess losses initially. Therefore, few organizations will tend to adopt. This small 
number of initial adopters will not generate a strong bandwagon pressure and, consequently, 
will not cause many bandwagon adoptions. If, however, the variance is larger, organizations' 
initial assessed profits will tend to differ to a greater extent, and there will be a greater 
dispersion of initial assessed profits about the mean. This will increase the number of 
organizations that assess profits initially and adopt. These initial adopters will generate 
stronger bandwagon pressure, causing more bandwagon adoptions. 
 What explains the second pattern, declining numbers of bandwagon adopters when 
the variance increases past the second critical value (P2)?  The answer is complicated. 
Remember that bandwagon processes animate a feedback loop in which growing 
bandwagon pressures prompt the number of bandwagon adopters to increase, and increases 
in the number of these bandwagon adopters prompts reputational pressure to grow. The 
process cont inues cycling only so long as the reputations of new bandwagon adopters raises 
the bandwagon pressure sufficiently in one cycle to cause at least one organization that 
assessed losses to adopt in the next cycle. When, however, this organization's initial assessed 
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profits are much smaller than those of adopters in the previous cycle, the process will tend to 
stop cycling. This is so because the increase in the bandwagon pressure is too small to make 
this organization's bandwagon assessment positive. Consider now, that whenever the 
variance in initial assessed profits is large, organizations' assessments tend to differ more 
extensively, and it is more likely that an organization will assess profits that are much 
smaller than those of organizations that adopted in the previous cycle.  It follows, therefore, 
that bandwagons will tend to stop cycling more often. In sum, increases in the variance of 
initial assessed profits produce stronger bandwagon pressures, but they also reduce their 
impact, resulting in this declining number of bandwagon adopters past the second critical 
value.7 
4.2  Simulation 2:  Varying Ambiguity and Reputation Variance 
 Our second simulation explores how the level of ambiguity, when allowed to vary, 
affects the influence of reputation variance on the extent of bandwagon diffusion.  So we 
allow ambiguity to vary across the twenty increments from zero to one, while we fix 
assessed profits variance at its midpoint of 0.75.  All other considerations remain the same 
as in Simulation 1.   
 Results are graphed in Figure 3.  Again, to provide clarity, only a subset of the 
ambiguity results is shown on the graphs.  Three distinct patterns are revealed.  The first 
pattern is obvious – the greater the ambiguity, the more bandwagon adoptions will result.  
This is a direct consequence of equation 2 – greater ambiguity increases the reputational 
pressure and motivates more adoptions. 
                                                                 
    7 Simulation results available from the authors indicate that in scenarios in which there are equal numbers of initial 
adopters, but different distributions of assessed profits, the proportion of bandwagon adopters varies substantially. This 
suggests that the extent of bandwagon diffusion depends not only on the impetus given to a bandwagon by initial adopters, 
but also on the variance of other organizations' assessed profits. 
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 Second, and also to be expected, in the trickle-around scenario, reputation variance 
has little effect on the extent of diffusion, as denoted by the nearly-horizontal lines for all 
levels of ambiguity.  Since there is no correlation between assessed profits and reputation in 
this scenario, the cumulative effect of adopters’ reputations nets out. 
 The third pattern revealed in Figure 3 is the most interesting. When ambiguity is 
relatively low (no more than 0.05 in the trickle-down and trickle-up scenarios), the extent of 
adoption is low regardless of the level of reputation variance.  This effect can be seen in the 
nearly horizontal lines at the bottom of the trickle-down and trickle-up graphs.  As equation 
2 suggests, at low ambiguity, initial assessed profits dominate the decision to adopt.  When 
ambiguity is low, no distribution of reputations can create the conditions that enable 
extensive bandwagon diffusion.    
P3:  Under conditions of low ambiguity, the level of reputation variance in a 
collectivity has little effect on the extent of trickle-down or trickle-up diffusion. 
 
 When ambiguity is relatively high (at least 0.40 in the trickle-down scenario; at least 
0.60 in the trickle-up scenario), the extent of adoption is high regardless of the level of 
reputation variance. Thus while high ambiguity will cause organizations to place more 
weight on the reputations of adopters, and this bandwagon pressure will continue to impel 
adoptions throughout the collectivity, the ambiguity parameter is large enough so as to 
overwhelm any differences in the reputations of initial adopters.  In other words, under high 
ambiguity, potential adopters are likely to be influenced by any adoptions, whether they be 
by extremely high- or extremely low-reputation firms. While each adopter individually 
places more weight on reputational characteristics in making the decision to adopt, the 
overall extent of diffusion throughout the collectivity is unchanged by the level of reputation 
variance.   
24  
P4:  Under conditions of high ambiguity, the level of reputation variance in a 
collectivity has little effect on the extent of trickle-down or trickle-up diffusion. 
 
 Only under conditions of moderate ambiguity do we observe an effect of reputation 
variance on bandwagon extent.  In Figure 3, for the trickle-down and trickle-up scenarios, 
we can observe non-horizontal lines in the middle of each graph.  These lines are upward-
sloping in the trickle-down scenario and downward-sloping in the trickle-up scenario.  More 
specifically,  
P5:  Under conditions of moderate ambiguity, higher levels of reputation 
variance in collectivities will increase the extent of trickle-down diffusion and 
decrease the extent of trickle-up diffusion. 
 
 What explains these results? In trickle-down diffusions, initial adopters are high-
reputation organizations. The higher their reputations, the stronger the reputational 
bandwagon pressure they cause, and the more bandwagon adoptions result. Initial adopters' 
reputations will tend to be higher when the variance in the distribution of reputations in the 
collectivity is greater, due to the strong correlation between initial assessed profits and 
reputations. It follows, therefore, that the higher this variance, the more bandwagon 
adoptions will occur during trickle-down diffusion. 
 In trickle-up diffusions, the reverse happens. Initial adopters are low-reputation 
organizations. The higher their reputations, the stronger the reputational bandwagon 
pressure they cause, and the more bandwagon adoptions result. Their reputations will tend to 
be higher when the variance in the distribution of reputations in the collectivity is lower, due 
to the strong negative correlation between initial assessed profits and reputations. It follows, 
therefore, that the lower this variance, the more bandwagon adoptions will occur during 
trickle-up diffusion. 
4.3  Simulation 3:  Introducing Learning 
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 In Simulations 1 and 2 we explored the effects of assessed profits variance and 
reputation variance under varying levels of ambiguity.  It remains to assess whether these 
effects are sustained when we incorporate learning by using equation 3 to motivate adoption 
decisions and by allowing the learning lag to vary between 1 and 6 cycles. 
 Since the addition of another variable complicates graphical interpretation of our 
data, we use an alternate approach to test the robustness of our earlier propositions.  
Following Nelson and Winter (1982), we generated random cases within the allowable 
ranges of our parameters, and tested the proposed effects via regression.  Thus, for each 
case, we drew ambiguity randomly from a uniform distribution on [0,1]; assessed profits 
variance from a uniform distribution on [0.0, 1.5]; reputation variance from a uniform 
distribution on [0.0, 0.3], and the learning lag from the integer range between 1 and 6 
inclusive.  5000 cases were simulated for each of the trickle-down and trickle-up scenarios8. 
 Table 1 presents OLS regression results for both scenarios9.  In the four nested 
models, support for the robustness of our propositions may be derived.  First, we observe the 
curvilinear relationship between assessed profits variance and the extent of diffusion, as 
model 1 and model 2 display a significant positive relationship between these terms, while 
the inclusion of (assessed profits variance)2 in model 2 obtains a significant negative 
coefficient and a corresponding significant increase in R2.  Note that these effects hold in 
both the trickle-up and trickle-down scenarios and thus, propositions 1 and 2 are robust 
when profitability information flows from early to later adopters.  The regression results also 
highlight that the level of ambiguity retains its significant positive effect on the proportion of 
bandwagon adopters even when profitability information is available. 
                                                                 
8 The results for the trickle-around case are not qualitatively different and are available from the authors. 
9 We do not present a correlation table as correlations between randomly drawn independent variables are virtually nil. 
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 Next, we explore the relationship between reputation variance and the extent of 
diffusion.  Models 1 and 2 display significant coefficients for this effect:  a negative  
relationship between reputation variance and bandwagon diffusion in the trickle-up case, 
but a positive relationship between reputation variance and bandwagon diffusion in the 
trickle-down case.   These effects correspond to the effects observed in middle ranges of 
the graphs in Figure 3 (recall that we have controlled for ambiguity in these regressions).  
 We employed two additional models to test for the generalizability of the relation in 
figure 3. As shown in table 1, for both trickle-up and trickle-down bandwagons, model 3 
suggests that a linear interaction term captured by the product of ambiguity and reputation 
variance is not statistically significant. However, if we model a curvilinear interaction by 
adding, in model 4, the product of ambiguity squared and reputation variance, the first 
interaction term is positive and significant, the second interaction term is negative and 
significant, as is the corresponding increase in R2 of model 4 over model 3. Therefore, 
reputation variance for a collectivity tends to affect the proportion of bandwagon adopters 
only when ambiguity is moderate, not when it is either low or high. These results suggest 
that propositions 3 through 5 are robust when profitability information flows from early to 
later adopters. 
 We added a variable in this simulation: the length of the learning lag. The regression 
results indicate that, for both trickle-up and trickle-down bandwagons, this learning lag has a 
significant, positive effect on the proportion of bandwagon adopters.  What explains this 
relationship?  In this simulation, we randomly drew the profitability of an innovation for an 
adopter from a distribution with a negative mean. Therefore, after a learning lag, L, adopters 
tend to learn that the innovation produces losses. Non-adopters also learn this information, 
and it tends to dissuade them from jumping on the bandwagon. The longer the learning lag, 
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however, the greater the number of cycles during which reputational bandwagon pressure 
impels bandwagon adoptions, and in turn, the greater the proportion of organizations in a 
collectivity that jump on the bandwagon before it is halted by information about the 
innovations' losses. 
 To explore the relationship between learning lags and ambiguity in more detail, we 
revert back to our original methodology.  Here we set assessed profits variance to .75 and 
reputation variance to its midpoint, 0.15.  Then we vary ambiguity and learning lags in the 
previously specified ranges, and graph our results in figure 4.  This figure indicates that the 
relation between learning lag and the proportion of bandwagon adopters is also moderated 
by the level of ambiguity. More specifically, for a given level of ambiguity less than 0.10, 
we observe little variance in the proportion of imitators regardless of the length of the 
learning lag.  At the same time, for a given level of ambiguity greater than 0.60, we observe 
the same phenomenon.  Only for given levels of ambiguity between these two values do we 
observe substantial differences in bandwagon extent due to the length of the learning lag. 
 P6: Only under conditions of moderate ambiguity about an innovation's 
efficiency or profitability does a greater learning lag cause a more 
extensive trickle-up or trickle-down bandwagon of this innovation. 
 
 Why does the positive correlation between learning lag and proportion of adopters 
hold only under conditions of moderate ambiguity?  Under low-ambiguity conditions, 
information about initial adopters' reputations creates weak bandwagon pressure and 
therefore few bandwagon adoptions due to this reputational pressure. Most organizations 
that did not adopt initially wait to learn whether the innovation profited adopters. Whether 
the learning lag makes them wait for more or fewer cycles, the outcome is the same. They 
learn that the innovation is unprofitable and they do not adopt it. Therefore, under low-
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ambiguity conditions, learning lags have little effect on the extent to which unprofitable 
innovations diffuse.  
 Under high-ambiguity conditions, information about initial adopters' reputations 
create powerful bandwagon pressures and many bandwagon adoptions of an innovation. 
These reputational bandwagon pressures overwhelm counter-bandwagon pressures caused 
by information revealing that an innovation is unprofitable. This occurs regardless of 
whether non-adopters learn of this information after few or many lags. Therefore, under 
high-ambiguity conditions, learning lags have little effect on the extent to which 
unprofitable innovations diffuse. 
 Under moderate-ambiguity conditions, information about initial adopters' 
reputations create bandwagon pressures strong enough to cause an innovation's bandwagon 
diffusion, but weak enough for this bandwagon to be halted by counter-bandwagon 
pressures caused by information revealing that this innovation is unprofitable. Under these 
conditions, learning lags can make a big difference in the extent to which unprofitable 
innovations diffuse. Long learning lags make it possible for reputational bandwagon  
pressures to prompt large proportions of collectivities to adopt unprofitable innovations. 
Short learning lags, to the contrary, cause bandwagons to grind to a halt after a few such 
bandwagon adoptions.   
 Recall that we made the simplifying assumption that achieved profits would not vary 
with the number of adopters. Obviously, a variety of functional forms could be used to 
represent externalities. An exploration of the consequences of using different functional 
forms is beyond the scope of this paper. In general, however, we can expect that positive 
externalities would increase average achieved profits and therefore the number of adopters, 
whereas negative externalities would have the opposite effect. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 Our threshold model of bandwagon diffusion demonstrates how unprofitable 
innovations can diffuse through organizational collectivities, even when information 
about the innovation’s unprofitability is available to organizations.  While the model 
follows in the tradition of herd behavior findings (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; 
Banerjee, 1992), two features distinguish it from these predecessors.  First, our model is a 
multi-stage model, rather than a sequential model.  Organizations revisit the decision to 
adopt during each cycle of the model, thereby delaying adoption until the bandwagon 
pressure builds to a level that overcomes the predisposition to not adopt the innovation.  
We have shown that under certain conditions, bandwagon pressure builds sufficiently to 
even override information about the unprofitability of the innovation.   
 Secondly, our model demonstrates how varying heterogeneity of organizational 
reputations influences bandwagon extent.  The Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Banerjee 
(1992) models treat decisions by each firm equally, as do the earlier Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf (1993; 1997) models.  Here, we model the case where adoptions by higher-
reputation organizations create more pressure to adopt on non-adopters.  We have shown 
how the variance of reputations in a collectivity influences bandwagon extent under 
moderate levels of ambiguity, and how this influence differs under trickle-up and trickle-
down patterns of diffusion. 
 The relationships between ambiguity, reputation variance, and bandwagon extent 
are complex and merit fur ther discussion. We find that very different processes impel 
bandwagon diffusions of innovations when ambiguity surrounding an innovation is high, 
moderate, or low. In low-ambiguity conditions, organizations that do not adopt an 
innovation in the initial stage of diffusion base their decision whether to adopt the 
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innovation on information about its profitability for organizations that did adopt in the initial 
stage. Under these conditions, unprofitable innovations will tend not to diffuse past a few 
initial adoptions, because organizations that do not adopt initially will tend to receive 
information indicating that the innovation is unprofitable, and they will not adopt it. 
 Under high-ambiguity conditions, a very simple bandwagon process animates 
bandwagon diffusion. The greater the number of organizations that adopt an innovation, 
regardless of their reputations or of the profits they achieve from adopting, the greater the 
bandwagon pressure to adopt exerted on organizations that have not yet adopted in the ir 
collectivity. These "numerical" bandwagons can cause both profitable and unprofitable 
innovations to diffuse.  
 The most complex and interesting bandwagon processes occur under moderate-
ambiguity conditions. Under these conditions, our theory and model suggest that 
information about both the reputation of adopters and the profits they achieve from adopting 
influence the course of bandwagon diffusions. More specifically, we show that the 
bandwagon diffusion of unprofitable innovations is greater when the learning lag before 
their unprofitability is revealed is longer. Moreover, trickle-down bandwagons are more 
extensive when reputational variance in a collectivity is greater, whereas trickle-up 
bandwagons are more extensive when reputational variance in the collectivity is smaller.  
 These implications of our threshold model suggest where researchers should focus 
their attention. With high ambiguity, researchers should focus only on the distribution of 
initial assessed profits to innovating. When ambiguity about initial assessed profits is low, 
researchers should focus primarily on the distribution of initial assessed profits to 
innovating, profits generated by innovations, and lags to learning about these profits. 
Finally, with moderate ambiguity, researchers should also focus on the distribution of initial 
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assessed profits to innovating, the distribution of organizational reputations, profits 
generated by innovations, and lags to learning about these profits. 
 Several limitations of our model remain to be addressed in future research. Our 
model and its simulation may be most accurate in contexts where collectivity members' 
reputations, as well as the ambiguity surrounding the innovation's profitability, are relatively 
invariant. In other contexts, however, an organization's reputation may be only as high as its 
profits from the last innovation it adopted. In these contexts our model's accuracy may be 
enhanced by modifying it to reflect how initial adopters' profits or losses from adopting an 
innovation alter the distribution of reputations in the collectivity. In other contexts, the 
diffusion of an innovation may reduce ambiguity about its technical efficiency or 
profitability (Rogers, 1983: 244). In these collectivities, our model's accuracy may be 
enhanced by making ambiguity a function of the number of adopters.  
 Our model may also be most accurate in predicting the extent of bandwagon 
diffusion in collectivities of organizations that are both densely linked by communication 
channels and bounded by high entry barriers. High entry barriers guarantee that, as our 
theory and model assume, the number of collectivity members remains constant during 
bandwagons. The diffusion of certain innovations may, however, draw new members into 
low entry-barrier collectivities. Our model's accuracy may be enhanced for such low-entry-
barrier collectivities by making collectivity size a function of the number of adopters. Dense 
linking in inter-organizational communication networks guarantees that, as we assume in 
our theory and model, all organizations obtain information about other organizations 
adoptions. Other collectivities, however, may be sparsely linked. Thus, the accuracy of the 
model may be enhanced by modeling the structure of the collectivity's communication 
network.  While we have incorporated network structure into the basic model in a separate 
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paper (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf , 1997), simultaneous consideration of network, 
reputational, and informational effects may yield additional insight. 
 Finally, our models may be more accurate in contexts where innovations are hard to 
reverse and organizations are slow to exnovate -- that is, to reject innovations that turn our to 
be unprofitable. Indeed, the theory and model in this article make no provision for 
exnovation. It does not because, as Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) show, the dynamics 
of exnovation are much more complex than the dynamics of adoption. Perhaps for this 
reason, calls for theorizing and research in this area still remain unheeded (Kimberly, 1981). 
Bandwagon exnovation remains, therefore, a fruitful area for further theoretical 
development and modeling. 
 In conclusion, in today’s environment of strict resource constraints, it is not only 
important that innovations diffuse quickly. It is also important that profitable innovations 
diffuse and that unprofitable innovations do not. This article has drawn on extant theorizing 
in the innovation diffusion literature in order to develop a general, yet relatively simple 
theory of innovation diffusion useful in explaining when and how extensively unprofitable 
innovations diffuse across organizations. 
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 Table 1 
 
Determinants of Trickle-Up and Trickle-Down Bandwagon Adoption: 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficients 
 
 
 
Trickle-Up    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Assessed Profits    .57**  1.1**  1.1**   1.1** 
Variance (APV) 
 
(APV)2          -.37**  -.37**  -.37** 
 
Reputation   -.19**  -.20**  -.28**  -1.1** 
Variance (RV) 
 
Learning Lag   .021**   .020**   .021**  .019** 
 
Ambiguity (A)   .48**   .47**   .45**    .46** 
 
A * RV         .15   4.9** 
 
A2 * RV          -4.8** 
 
R2    .70   .74   .74    .77 
F    2934**   2776**   2314**   2361** 
df    4995   4994   4993  4992 
 
 
 
Trickle-Down    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Assessed Profits   .60**  1.4**  1.4**  1.4** 
Variance (APV) 
 
(APV)2           -.50**  -.50**  -.50** 
 
Reputation   .063*  .079**   .16**  -.74** 
Variance (RV) 
 
Learning Lag   .014**  .014**   .014**   .014** 
 
Ambiguity (A)   .40**  .40**   .43**   .43** 
 
A * RV        -.17  5.2** 
 
A2 * RV              -5.4** 
 
R2    .69  .75   .75   .79 
F    2767**  2990**   2493**   2719** 
df    4995  4994   4993  4992 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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